Professor of Economics
ENS Paris-Saclay
Member of Market Design Group
ZEW, Mannheim
Research Fellow
CESifo, Munich
A working paper (updated September 2021), Auctions with Signaling Bidders: Optimal Design and Information Disclosure, with Martin Pollrich.
An article, Entry in First-price Auctions with Signaling with Tom Truyts, accepted in the International Journal of Game Theory.
The workshop Signaling in Social Interactions and takes place on June 8-9, 2022.
The 2nd KIT-Paris-ZEW Workshop on Market Design takes place at Panthéon-Assas University on June 27-28, 2022.
ANR Grant (French National Agency for Research) Signaling in Auctions and Mechanisms: Theory and Experimental Evidence, from February 2020, 70 months.