What's new?

A working paper (updated March 2022), Auctions with Signaling Bidders: Optimal Design and Information Disclosure, with Martin Pollrich.

A working paper (March 2022), Signalling in Auctions for Risk-Averse and Loss-Averse Bidders, with Francisco Gomez-Martinez and Sander Onderstal.

An article, Entry in First-price Auctions with Signaling with Tom Truyts, accepted in the International Journal of Game Theory.

The program of Virtual Market Design Seminar Series for winter and spring 2022 is now available. The Virtual MD Seminar is a bi-weekly online and inter-institutional seminar, which takes place on Monday at 4:00pm CET (Paris time).

The workshop Signaling in Social Interactions takes place on June 8-9, 2022.

The 2nd KIT-Paris-ZEW Workshop on Market Design takes place at Panthéon-Assas University on June 27-28, 2022.

ANR Grant (French National Agency for Research) Signaling in Auctions and Mechanisms: Theory and Experimental Evidence, from February 2020, 70 months.