What's new?

The program of Virtual Market Design Seminar Series for this fall. The Virtual MD Seminar is a bi-weekly online seminar and inter-institutional initiative.

A working paper (updated September 2022), Auctions with Signaling Bidders: Optimal Design and Information Disclosure, with Martin Pollrich.

A working paper (updated August 2022), Existence of Equilibrium in All-Pay Auctions with Price Externalities.

An article, Entry in First-price Auctions with Signaling with Tom Truyts, accepted in the International Journal of Game Theory.

An article, Signalling in Auctions for Risk-Averse Bidders, with Francisco Gomez-Martinez and Sander Onderstal, accepted in PLOS One.

ANR Grant (French National Agency for Research) Signaling in Auctions and Mechanisms: Theory and Experimental Evidence, from February 2020, 70 months.