Auctions with Signaling Bidders: Optimal Design and Information Disclosure, with Martin Pollrich.
Existence of Equilibrium in All-Pay Auctions with Price Externalities, R&R at Social Choice and Welfare.
Entry in First-price Auctions with Signaling, with Tom Truyts, International Journal of Game Theory, forthcoming.
Signalling in Auctions for Risk-Averse Bidders, with Francisco Gomez-Martinez and Sander Onderstal, PLoS ONE, 2022, vol. 17(10), e0275709.
Signalling in Auctions: Experimental Evidence, with Francisco Gomez-Martinez, Sander Onderstal and Tom Truyts, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2021, vol. 187, pp. 448-469.
Auctions with Signaling Concerns, with Tom Truyts, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2021, vol. 30(2), pp. 420-448.
Charitable Asymmetric Bidders, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2020, vol. 22(2), pp. 320-337.
Risk and Unraveling in Labor Markets, with Martin Ranger, Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2018, vol. 129, pp. 127-144.
Agreeing on Efficient Emissions Reduction, with Béatrice Roussillon and Paul Schweinzer, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2016, vol. 118(4), pp. 785-815. Online supplementary material available here.
Charity Auctions for the Happy Few, Mathematical Social Sciences, 2016, vol 79(C), pp. 83-92.
All-Pay Auction with Polynomial Rewards, with Martin Ranger, Annals of Economics and Statistics, 2014, vol. 115-116, pp. 361-377.
Wars of Attrition and All-Pay Auctions with Stochastic Competition, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2012, vol. 48(2), pp. 83-91.
How Lotteries Outperform Auctions, Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 110(3), pp. 262-264. A longer version is available here.
Effets de réputation dans les enchères : l'inégalité des perdants, with Tom Truyts, Revue Economique, 2021, vol. 73, pp. 443-458.
L'enchère à offres payantes. Un mécanisme aux applications diverses, Revue Economique, 2011, vol. 62, pp. 5-28.